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Abstract 
Generic advertising of fluid milk and cheese represents the principal promotional activity undertaken with the $370 million per year provided 
by dairy farmers and fluid milk processors. This article describes a stock-flow-feedback simulation model that includes 17 intermediate and final 
dairy products, short-term and long-term milk supply response and government policies that influence the impacts of generic advertising on net 
revenues for dairy farmers. Permanent increases in generic advertising expenditures increase net revenues for dairy farmers, with a cumulative net 
benefit to cost ratio of 2.8. Permanent decreases produce a larger reduction in net revenues and indicate a net benefit to cost ratio larger than 4.5. 
Spending a larger proportion of existing generic advertising funds on cheese rather than fluid milk would also markedly increased dairy farmer net 
revenues. Generic advertising increases net revenues for dairy farmers even when industry supply response and government regulation are 
accounted for. 
. 
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Dairy farmers pay a mandatory assessment of 15 cents per 
hundred pounds of milk marketed in the continental United States 
to fund a national demand expansion program. This assessment 
generally ranges between 0.75 and 1% of the price farmers receive 
for their milk, and most of the money supports generic advertising 
of fluid milk (e.g., Got Milk?) and cheese (e.g., Behold the Power 
of Cheese) products. The aims of generic milk and dairy product 
advertising are to increase consumer demand for fluid milk and 
dairy products, enhance dairy farm revenues, and reduce the 
amount of surplus milk purchased by the government under the 
Dairy Price Support Program. Legislative authority for these 
assessments dates back to the Dairy Production and Stabilization 
Act of 1983. More recently, fluid milk processors began their own 
generic fluid milk advertising program (e.g., the Milk Mustache 
print media campaign) funded by a mandatory $0.20 per hundred 
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pounds processor check-off on fluid milk sales. These two 
programs represent the two largest generic advertising programs 
in the United States, raising $370 million per year. 
Generic advertising differs from traditional branded advertis­
ing in several important ways. First, although branded advertising 
is an individual firm's activity, generic advertising is a collective 
effort by all firms within an industry. Second, branded advertising 
attempts to differentiate a firm's product from its competitors; 
generic advertising is not geared at product differentiation and is 
most successful for products with homogeneous characteristics 
such as basic commodities. Third, the goal of generic advertising 
is to increase overall demand for a commodity, whereas branded 
advertising is primarily firm market share driven. A final dis­
tinction is that dairy generic advertising's ultimate goal is to 
increase both the quantity and price of a raw input (milk) through 
shifts in the demand curve for dairy products requiring that input. 
The long-run effectiveness of the program in increasing 
demand and the price of milk will depend critically on the nature 
of the milk supply response. For example, if the long-run supply 
curve for the industry is perfectly elastic, any increase in demand 
due to generic advertising will not increase price or producer 
surplus. In contrast, demand increases with an upward sloping 
long-run supply curve increase both price and producer surplus 
under effective generic advertising. Consequently, modelers must 
explicitly link supply response to demand and price increases due 
to advertising to evaluate the impact of generic dairy advertising. 
Because dairy is the largest generic advertising program, 
numerous studies on the economic impacts of generic dairy 
advertising exist (see Ferrero et al. (1996) for an annotated bib­
liography). This research falls into two broad categories. The first 
category of research is positive in nature, evaluating the economic 
impacts of generic advertising on dairy markets. The majority of 
this research indicates that generic advertising increases overall 
market sales and prices at farm, wholesale and retail market levels, 
and that the benefits of generic advertising substantially outweigh 
the costs. Kaiser (2006) found a benefit-cost ratio of 4.32 for fluid 
milk and cheese advertising by dairy farmers. The second line of 
research is normative in nature, investigating optimal allocation 
issues. Studies include optimal spatial allocation of advertising by 
markets (Liu and Forker, 1990), allocation of advertising over 
time (Vande Kamp and Kaiser, 2000), allocation of advertising 
across products (Kaiser and Forker, 1993), allocation of 
advertising by media type (Pritchett et al., 1998) and allocation 
of expenditures by marketing and research activity (Chung and 
Kaiser, 1999). All these studies use econometric methods, 
optimization, or a combination of both. No previous studies of 
the impacts of generic dairy advertising employ stock-flow­
feedback models that include explicit balancing of dairy 
component (e.g., fat, protein, lactose) to assess market impacts. 
Two characteristics of US dairy markets create challenges for 
researchers interested in modeling the impacts of generic dairy 
advertising. First, the US dairy industry is highly regulated. Milk 
pricing at the farm, dairy processor and retail levels depends on 
federal and state milk marketing orders (which regulate minimum 
prices that must be paid to farmers), the Dairy Price Support 
Program (which provides a farm-level price floor and safety net 
through government purchases of selected dairy products), and 
import tariffs (which complement other price-related policies by 
dramatically limiting imports of some dairy products). Properly 
incorporating the impacts of these regulations on prices is es­
sential for sound evaluation of generic advertising. Second, raw 
milk is a commodity that has many components with different end 
uses. Modeling all the possible uses for these components and the 
associated component-based pricing structure of the regulated 
market is a complicated process. Nearly all previous studies of 
generic advertising's impacts deal with these issues through 
simplifying assumptions about milk components and a high 
degree of aggregation for dairy products. They therefore omit 
potentially important linkages that could affect the accuracy of 
predicted model outcomes (Bishop et al., 1994). These two 
characteristics of the dairy market make the use of a model with 
disaggregated representation of dairy products, components and 
price regulations policy instruments quite appealing. 
Accordingly, this paper has four objectives. The first is to 
examine the dynamic market impacts of increases and decreases 
in generic advertising expenditures for both fluid milk and cheese 
in a multiple-product dynamic simulation model. The analysis 
also allows the computation of a cumulative benefit–cost ratio 
to assess the effectiveness of generic advertising in a dynamic 
context. The second objective is to determine the allocation of 
fluid milk and cheese expenditures that maximizes net revenues 
received by dairy farmers for a given level of generic advertising 
expenditures. A third objective is to demonstrate the applicability 
of a systems modeling approach to the evaluation of generic 
advertising. A final, broader, objective is to contribute to under­
standing of how generic advertising influences product markets. 
1. Model description 
A causal diagram illustrates a number of the differences 
between the impacts of generic and branded advertising (Fig. 1). 
The diagram depicts a number of balancing (B) and reinforcing 
(R) feedback processes associated with the impacts of generic 
advertising. In contrast to branded advertising, the ultimate 
objective of generic advertising is to increase net revenues for 
input suppliers (dairy farmers in this case). The mechanism for 
this is as follows. Generic advertising expenditures increase sales 
of the advertised products, which decreases inventories (a phys­
ical stock, depicted with a box in Fig. 1), increases their price, 
increases the net margin earned from them and stimulates 
additional production. Increases in production of the advertised 
product increase the demand for the raw input (milk) needed as an 
input. Increased raw input use for the manufacture of advertised 
products (in this case, fluid milk and cheese) decreases the avail­
ability of the raw input to manufacture non-advertised products 
(e.g., butter, dried milk). This reduces the available supply of non-
advertised products, increasing their price. As noted above, mini­
mum raw input price regulation exists in the US dairy industry; 
the minimum price paid to farmers is calculated as a function of 
product prices and product for which the raw input is used. An 
increase in the price of non-advertised products increases the 
minimum regulated price. The price increase for advertised 
products also contributes to increases in the minimum regulated 
price. A higher minimum regulated price increases the net rev­
enues earned by raw input suppliers (the objective), but also 
increases input costs for all products. The input cost increase 
increases the prices of all products, which will have a dampening 
effect on demand. 
Fig. 1 facilitates discussion of the principal balancing and 
reinforcing processes at work in the US dairy industry. The term 
balancing loop (B) implies that an initial change in one of the 
variables in the loop will ultimately result in pressure for that 
variable to move in the direction opposite the change, all other 
things being equal. In contrast, a reinforcing loop (R) indicates 
than an initial change will be reinforced through the feedback 
Output/process. More formally, feedback loop polarity is SGN(φX1 
φX1
Input) where SGN is the sign function, X Output is the value of a 
variable X after one feedback cycle in response to an initial 
change in the value of X Input (Sterman, 2000). 
Conceptually, three feedback processes have an important 
impact on the ultimate effectiveness of generic advertising to 
achieve its objective of increasing input supplier net revenues 
(Fig. 1). The production response loop is a typical market 
response: increased profitability of advertised production results 
in additional supplies, increasing inventories and reducing price 
relative to what would have occurred in the absence of a pro­
duction response. The second feedback process (the regulated 
Fig. 1. Causal diagram of generic advertising effects in the US dairy sector. 
price loop) implies that the effects of generic advertising will be 
offset to a certain extent through increases in input costs for all 
dairy product manufacturers through increases in the minimum 
regulated price. Supply response by input suppliers (the supply 
response loop) indicates that increases in the price for the raw 
input supplier will increase the quantity supplied of the raw 
product. This increases the availability of the raw input for use in 
the manufacture of non-advertised products, decreasing those 
product prices compared to what they would have been. An 
important issue in the evaluation of generic advertising expen­
ditures is the extent to which the production response, the mini­
mum price regulation and raw input supply response feedback 
processes erode the effectiveness of advertising expenditures over 
time. 
To evaluate the effectiveness of generic advertising in the dairy 
industry context, a more detailed empirical model is necessary. 
This model builds upon a previous conceptual commodity 
(Sterman, 2000) and the dairy industry price determination 
model in Nicholson and Fiddaman (2003). To capture the effects 
of minimum price regulation, the model includes a total of 17 final 
and intermediate dairy products. In most dairy-related models, 
intermediate products are those dairy products used in the 
manufacture of other dairy products. A common example is the 
use of dried milk in cheese manufacturing. Final products are 
those used by non-dairy manufacturers (e.g., other food pro­
cessors) or final consumers. Perishable products such as fluid 
milk, yogurt and ice cream are flow variables for which pro­
duction is equal to sales. Commercial inventories of storable 
commodities such as butter, cheese, dried milk and dried whey 
(used in the minimum pricing formulae) are stock variables, 
where production increases inventories and sales reduce them. 
Increases in commercial inventories of these products result in 
decreases in the prices of these products. In the dairy industry, 
manufacturers separate raw milk into a variety of components 
(butterfat, proteins, lactose and minerals) using various physical 
processes (e.g., filtration). As a result, dairy models should 
adequately represent the physical balance of these components 
across different product uses. The model includes the use of skim 
milk and cream components to capture component balance. Es­
sentially, cream represents fat and skim milk represents protein, 
lactose and minerals. 
In addition to the minimum regulated pricing that operates in 
the dairy industry, other key policy interventions include price 
supports for selected manufactured products (butter, cheese and 
dried milk) and restrictions on dairy product trade. Price 
supports operate through the willingness of the Commodity 
Credit Corporation (CCC; established by the federal govern­
ment) to purchase dairy products at prices designed to maintain 
a minimum level of milk prices paid to dairy farmers, or through 
direct payments made to farmers when milk prices fall below a 
target level. Dairy trade policies restrict the quantities of many 
imported (storable) products, which historically has maintained 
US milk and dairy product prices above those in international 
markets. Although under recent market conditions these 
policies have limited impact on the effectiveness of generic 
advertising and are not shown in Fig. 1, the empirical model 
includes them. 
Supply response occurs through changes in both productivity 
per unit of capital (milk production per cow per year) and changes 
in the capital stock (the number of cows). Productivity responds 
with a delay to changes in the price of the raw input (milk) in the 
short run (complete response to a step change in the milk price 
relative to a reference price occurs within about 3 months), 
whereas the number of cows responds to an exponential smooth 
(another delay) of relative net margins over 3 years. The number 
of cows results from a biological reproduction rate (assumed to be 
 
 
 
 
 
constant) and the rate of removal of animals from the aggregated 
national herd, which depends on the profitability of milk 
production. The rate of removal is the inverse of the average 
animal lifetime, which is a function of current margins relative 
to long-term expectations. The degree to which dairy farmers 
modify average animal lifetimes in response to relative margins is 
unknown, so the impacts of this parameter on simulated outcomes 
are evaluated with sensitivity analysis. 
The impact of generic advertising on the demand for fluid 
milk and cheese is modeled as a modified multiplicative-
reference formulation (Sterman, 2000) as follows: 
" ! ( ! ) #gj	 gj
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SalesREF ¼ Sales2004 � 1 þ hjjt j 
This formulation implies that sales of advertised dairy prod­
uct j at time t are a function of a sales in the 2004 reference 
(base) year, product price Pj relative to reference price, and the 
maximum of the effect of generic advertising expenditures 
relative to their 2004 reference value or a minimum assumed 
proportion, MPj, of the reference dairy product sales in the 
absence of generic advertising expenditures (GAE). The 
minimum proportion term is necessary to avoid zero sales in 
the absence of generic advertising. The parameters ηj and γj are 
elasticities of sales with respect to price and generic advertising 
expenditures, respectively. Reference sales values grow over 
time at proportional monthly growth rates θj due to exogenous 
population and income growth. To reflect delays in the 
adjustment of consumer behavior to changes in price and 
generic advertising expenditures, the specification assumes 
exponential smoothing with a time constant of one month. 
The model is formulated as a system of nonlinear differential 
equations solved by numerical integration. Parameter values for 
behavioral responses to prices and inventory levels and the initial 
stock values are from previous dairy industry models (Bishop and 
Nicholson, 2004; Nicholson and Fiddaman, 2003), data from 
the Agricultural Marketing Service of the US Department of 
Agriculture (which administers the minimum pricing regula­
tions), and an extensive network of industry contacts (Cornell 
Program on Dairy Markets and Policy, 2006). Values of the 
elasticity of fluid milk and cheese demand with respect to 
advertising expenditures are from Kaiser and Dong (2006), and 
are equal to 0.037 and 0.035, respectively. Values of the elasticity 
of fluid milk and cheese demand with respect to price come from 
Schmit and Kaiser (2004) and Bishop and Nicholson (2004) and 
are equal to −0.2 and −0.5, respectively. The model simulates all 
variables at monthly time intervals over the six-year period 2004 
to 2009 using a small calculation interval to approximate a 
continuous-time system. Model evaluation followed the process 
Sterman (2000) describes. A previous version of the model 
evaluated the impact of growth in dairy product demand on dairy 
farmer revenues (Nicholson and Stephenson, 2006). For the 
purposes of the analyses herein, underlying growth in demand 
for dairy products (i.e., outward shifts in the demand curves) in 
response to increases in household income and population are 
exogenous, and are from Nicholson and Stephenson (2006) and 
Schmit and Kaiser (2006). Although the financial resources for 
generic advertising in the dairy industry derive from assessments 
on dairy farmers and fluid milk processors (and thus depend on 
milk production and sales of fluid milk) the allocation of funds to 
generic advertising is not proportional to funds available, so 
generic advertising expenditures are exogenous. 
2. Model scenarios 
Two rather stylized types of analyses of the dynamic market 
impacts of generic advertising are the focus herein (Table 1). The 
first is an analysis of permanent (i.e., step) changes in generic 
advertising in the presence of growth in demand for dairy 
products, and the second is an analysis of which proportional 
allocation of 2004 advertising expenditures between fluid milk 
and cheese maximizes cumulative discounted dairy farmer net 
revenues. For each of these scenarios, the impact of two assumed 
values of the long-term supply response (sensitivity of average 
animal lifetime to profitability) is evaluated. For the baseline 
scenarios, the value of the sensitivity of average animal lifetime in 
response to relative net margins is equal to 1.0; for scenarios 
termed less sensitive, the value of this parameter is 0.5. The 
average animal lifetime uses a multiplicative-reference (constant 
elasticity) formulation in which the average lifetime is equal to a 
reference lifetime modified by the ratio of current smoothed net 
margins divided by a reference net margin to the power of the 
sensitivity parameter described above. 
The model is initialized using the average values of product 
prices, production and dairy product inventories for 2004. Base­
line scenarios include 2004 levels of generic advertising ex­
penditures and constant proportional growth in dairy product 
demand (the θj discussed above). Step changes in generic ad­
vertising occur in January 2006 and continue until December 
2009. Differences between the baseline scenario and scenarios 
with step changes indicate the impact of increasing or decreasing 
generic advertising expenditures. 
Table 1 
Generic advertising scenarios analyzed 
Scenario 1 Implementation 
Baseline	 Assumed exogenous growth rates for dairy products 
and 2004 level of generic advertising expenditure; 
allocations between fluid milk and cheese as in 2004 
Increase generic Increase generic advertising on both fluid milk 
advertising and cheese by 100% from 2004 levels as a 
permanent (step) change beginning in January 2006 
Eliminate Eliminate generic advertising on both fluid milk and 
Generic cheese as a permanent (step) change beginning in 
Advertising January 2006 
Optimal product Determine the optimal allocations of 2004 generic 
allocation of generic advertising expenditures between fluid milk and 
advertising cheese as a permanent step change beginning in 
January 2006 
1 For each of the scenarios, the impact of two assumed values of the long-term 
supply response (sensitivity of average animal lifetime equal to 0.5 or 1.0) is 
evaluated. 
Fig. 2. Fluid milk sales in response to increases and decreases in generic advertising expenditures, difference from baseline. 
Key outcome variables of interest are changes in product sales, these variables is likely to vary over time. The dynamic benefit– 
changes in selected dairy product prices, changes in dairy farmer cost ratio of generic advertising, previously evaluated only in a 
net revenues (monthly and cumulative revenues from milk sales static sense for dairy generic advertising, is of particular interest. 
less production costs), milk production (supply response) and the 
cumulative net benefit–cost ratio (CNBCR; the ratio of changes in 3. Results 
dairy farmer net revenues to changes in overall generic advertising 
expenditures). The changes in cumulative dairy farmer net reve- 3.1. Impacts of step increases or decreases in generic 
nues and the CNBCR are calculated from January 2006, when advertising expenditures 
changes in generic advertising expenditures occur. The results of 
each of the scenarios relative to the baseline indicate the impact of A permanent increase in generic fluid milk and cheese 
the change in generic advertising amounts or allocations. Because advertising expenditures initially increases fluid milk and cheese 
of the nonlinear feedback dynamics present in the system, each of sales during the first few months relative to the Baseline (Fig. 2 
Fig. 3. Cheese sales in response to increases and decreases in generic advertising expenditures, difference from baseline. 
Fig. 4. Milk production in response to increases and decreases in generic advertising expenditures, difference from baseline. 
and 3). The demand for raw milk to manufacture these products increase relative to the baseline (Fig. 8). Thus, the initial effects 
rises more quickly than milk production (Fig. 4) due to milk of the increase in generic advertising expenditures have the 
supply response delays arising from cow reproductive biology desired outcome of increasing producer net revenues. 
and farm-level decision making. The availability of milk for Over time, however, the effectiveness of the increase in 
non-advertised products decreases and their price increases expenditures is eroded by the balancing feedback processes. As 
(Fig. 5 indicates this for butter), which results in an increase in consumers respond to price increases brought about by 
the minimum regulated price (Fig. 6). The price of cheese increased demand for the raw milk to make fluid milk and 
increases (Fig. 7), which also contributes to an increase in the cheese, a relatively small decrease in fluid milk sales from their 
minimum regulated price, and cumulative producer net revenues peak value occurs during the next 12 months (Fig. 2). A similar 
Fig. 5. Butter prices in response to increases and decreases in generic advertising expenditures, by sensitivity of capital investment response, difference from baseline. 
Fig. 6. Producer milk price from in response to increases and decreases in generic advertising expenditures, by sensitivity of capital investment response, difference 
from baseline. 
pattern of behavior is observed for cheese sales (Fig. 3), but 
demand growth resumes in 2007 and continues through 2010 
because the underlying growth rate for cheese sales is 1.5% per 
year. Dairy producers respond with a delay to the increased 
minimum regulated prices, increasing both productivity and the 
capital stock (cows), which increases milk supplies. As more 
milk is produced (Fig. 4) and demand for fluid milk and cheese 
is dampened through the consumer response, more milk is 
available for use in non-advertised products. Increased produc­
tion of those products decreases their price (Fig. 5), increased 
cheese production (the production response loop from Fig. 1) 
decreases the cheese price (Fig. 7), and the minimum regulated 
price decreases. The increase in the minimum regulated price 
due to an increase in generic advertising expenditures falls from 
a peak of nearly $0.60 per 100 lbs in mid-2006 to less than 
$0.10 per 100 lbs by late 2008 (Fig. 6) as a result of supply 
response. After January 2008 the rate of increase of the dif­
ference in cumulative producer net revenues slows markedly 
(Fig. 8). 
Permanent elimination of generic advertising expenditures 
initially reduces fluid milk and cheese sales by a larger amount 
than the permanent increase raises them (Figs. 2 and 3). This 
Fig. 7. Cheese prices in response to increases and decreases in generic advertising expenditures, difference from baseline. 
Fig. 8. Cumulative producer revenues in response to increases and decreases in generic advertising expenditures, by sensitivity of capital investment response, 
difference from baseline. 
asymmetric effect arises from the use of the log-linear (constant 
elasticity) formulation for the effect of advertising expenditures 
in the advertised product demand equations. An initial rapid 
decrease in fluid milk and cheese sales is followed by a brief 
recovery, then continued decline. The initial pattern is essen­
tially the inverse of that observed for price increases, and again 
results from the interaction of dairy product demand, farm milk 
prices and milk production. The decrease in demand for fluid 
milk and cheese reduces the demand for raw milk, which 
increases the milk available for the manufacture of non-
advertised products, reducing their prices (Fig. 5), the cheese 
price (Fig. 7) and the minimum regulated price (Fig. 6). The 
lower milk prices result in lower milk production (Fig. 4) as 
dairy producers reduce productivity per cow and reduce cow 
numbers. The combination of a lower milk price and reduced 
quantity of production reduces cumulative producer revenues 
(Fig. 8). Over time, consumers respond to lower dairy product 
prices by increasing demand (Figs. 2 and 3) and the reduction in 
milk production becomes large enough to result in price in­
creases for non-advertised products and cheese (Figs. 5 and 7). 
This increases the minimum regulated price (Fig. 6) and the rate 
of decrease for the difference in cumulative producer net reve­
nues slows markedly after January 2008 (Fig. 8). 
An important conclusion to be drawn from these results is that 
milk prices will not always be higher for the scenario with 
increased generic advertising, nor lower for the scenario with 
elimination of generic advertising (Fig. 6). As milk production 
responds over time to initial price increases or decreases through 
the supply response feedback loop, about 30 months after the 
increase or decrease, farmer milk prices become higher (for the 
decrease) or lower (for the increase) than they would have been 
in the absence of any change in generic advertising expenditures. 
This effect is also observed in dairy product markets: by 2008 the 
butter price is lower and by 2009 the cheese price is lower than it 
would have been in the absence of increased generic advertising. 
Another important insight is that although the responsiveness of 
animal average lifetime to relative margins affects the numerical 
results, the patterns of behavior generally are similar for the more 
and less responsive scenarios. 
One principal objective of generic advertising for fluid milk 
and cheese is to increase net revenues received by US dairy 
farmers. The analyses suggest that even when various balancing 
feedback loops are taken into account, expenditures on generic 
advertising return far more net revenue to dairy farmers than the 
expenditures. A permanent doubling of generic advertising ex­
penditures would increase cumulative dairy farmer net revenues 
by between $1.3 and $2.2 billion, but would cost only about 
$485 million over the four years from 2006 to 2009 (Fig. 8). 
Elimination of generic advertising expenditures would reduce 
dairy farmer net revenues between $2.2 and $3.3 billion over 
those 4 years, when the sensitivity of milk production to changes 
in long-run margin is higher and lower, respectively. 
The cumulative net benefit–cost ratio (CNBCR) at time t 
during the period 2006 to 2009 is: R 2009 CNRS � CNRB t¼2006 t tCNBCRt ¼ R t¼2009 CGAES �CGAEB t¼2006 t t 
where CNRt represent the cumulative dairy farmer net revenues 
at time t for scenarios S and the baseline B and CGAEt are the 
cumulative generic advertising expenditures for the same 
scenario. The CNBCR varies over time depending on develop­
ments in dairy product markets (Fig. 9). However, for both 
increases and decreases in generic advertising expenditures the 
CNBCR grows rapidly then decreases. For a doubling of 
generic advertising expenditures, the CNBCR initially increases 
Fig. 9. Dynamic cumulative benefit cost ratio for increases and decreases in generic advertising expenditures, by sensitivity of capital investment response. 
to 5.2 and then decreases to 2.8 by the end of simulation. The 
sensitivity of dairy farmers to average animal lifetime has an 
impact on the CNBCR for generic advertising expenditure 
increases, with a value of 4.5 at the end of simulation when 
supply is less responsive. Both estimates are somewhat lower 
than past benefit–cost ratios estimated for generic dairy ad­
vertising on fluid milk and cheese (e.g., 4.88 for the period 1997 
to 2006 by Kaiser, 2007), probably due to better representation 
of balancing feedback effects. In the absence of generic 
advertising, the value of the CNBCR is larger (after the initial 
increase, the value is nearly 10 rather than 5) and ending values 
range from 4.5 (more sensitive) to 6.8 (less sensitive). 
An alternative measure of the returns to generic advertising is 
the current net benefit cost ratio (CuNBCR), which is the ratio for 
the CNBCR without the integral signs. Whereas the CNBCR 
indicates the average return at a given time, the current net benefit 
cost ratio indicates marginal returns. The CuNBCR increases to 
about 6.0 for increases in expenditures by mid-2006, then falls 
below 1.0 in mid-2008. For decreases in expenditures, the initial 
return increases to nearly 10.0 by mid-2006, but becomes nega­
tive in mid-2008. The CuNBCR is sensitive to assumptions about 
the responsiveness of the average animal lifetime to changes in 
profitability, with higher values for less sensitive responsiveness. 
Overall, the scenarios indicate that on average over the period 
2006 to 2009, increased generic advertising expenditures on fluid 
milk and cheese would increase fluid milk and cheese sales, 
increase milk production, increase cumulative dairy farmer 
revenues, and have a CNBCR (but not always the CuNBCR) 
far larger than 1.0 (Table 2). Conversely, elimination of the 
generic advertising expenditures would decrease fluid milk and 
cheese sales, decrease milk production, and decrease cumulative 
dairy farmer revenues. Moreover, the CNBCR of generic ad­
vertising expenditures may be larger at lower expenditure levels, 
as indicated by the asymmetries in response in doubling and 
elimination. Thus, the analyses support the effectiveness of 
generic advertising to enhance dairy farmer well-being, even in 
the face of multiple feedback loops and product market effects. 
3.2. Allocation of existing expenditures to maximize cumulative 
dairy farmer revenues 
Although the previous analyses address overall effectiveness 
of generic advertising expenditures, another relevant question is 
whether those expenditures have the largest possible effective­
ness, that is, that generates the largest cumulative dairy farmer net 
revenues. Past advertising allocation strategies have tended to 
emphasize fluid milk because the minimum regulated price paid 
to farmers is highest for milk used as a beverage. However, 
because the component content, demand elasticities and predicted 
growth rates of fluid milk and cheese differ and because they have 
different impacts on the minimum regulated price formulae, 
changes in the allocation of generic advertising expenditures 
could increase dairy farmer net revenues. To explore this hypoth­
esis, simulation runs using the Powell optimization algorithm in 
Vensim® dynamic simulation software (Ventana Systems, 2005) 
examine what step change in fluid milk advertising expenditures 
from funds provided by dairy farmers would maximize 
cumulative net revenues for dairy farmers. Because fluid milk 
processors allocate check-off funds only to generic advertising of 
fluid milk, assumed generic advertising expenditures by fluid 
milk processors do not change from 2004 levels. Corresponding 
changes in generic advertising expenditures for cheese and fluid 
milk by dairy farmers keep overall expenditures on generic ad­
vertising expenditures constant. The optimization exercise as­
sumes a permanent, simultaneous step change in allocation of 
generic advertising expenditures starting in January 2006. (Note 
that this approach differs from optimization to determine the 
optimal allocation of advertising expenditures across products 
 Table 2 
Summary of simulation scenario results 
Scenario	 Cumulative Average fluid Average Average milk Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative 
advertising milk sales cheese sales production producer producer net net benefit 
expenditures ($ mil) (mil lbs/mo) (mil lbs/mo) (bil lbs/mo) revenues ($ mil) revenues ($ mil) cost ratio 1 
Baseline (with demand growth) 
Base supply response 485.2 4776.0 317.4 14.7 114,314.7 −3263.7 – 
Less sensitive supply response 485.2 4777.5 317.7 14.8 113,602.3 −3976.7 – 
Change from Baseline 
Increase Generic Advertising 
Base supply response +485.2 109.0 4.6 0.2 3568.4 1348.4 2.8 
Less sensitive supply response +485.2 107.3 4.2 0.1 4408.8 2178.3 4.5 
Eliminate Generic Advertising 
Base supply response −485.2 −215.5 −10.2 −0.4 −6084.3 −2195.9 4.5 
Less sensitive supply response −485.2 −216.2 −10.2 −0.2 −6691.3 −3319.9 6.8 
Optimal Product Allocation of Generic 
Advertising 
Base supply response 0.0 2 −67.5 6.9 0.1 2253.5 897.1 – 3 
Less sensitive supply response 0.0 2 −67.3 6.7 0.1 2549.3 1245.0 – 3 
Note: All cumulative values represent the period January 2006 to December 2009. 
1 The cumulative benefit cost ratio is defined as the change in cumulative producer net revenues (from the baseline) divided by the change in cumulative advertising 
expenditures (from the baseline) at the end of model simulation time. This value is calculated for the reported scenarios, not as a change from the baseline scenario. 
2 No overall change occurs in aggregate generic advertising expenditures. However, $2.3 million per month of the funds provided by dairy farmers is switched 
from fluid milk to cheese advertising expenditures. 
3 Not reported because no change occurs in cumulative advertising expenditures, only a reallocation among the two advertised products. 
and over time, which may be addressed with future modifications 
to the model.) 
The optimization results indicate that dairy farmer net revenues 
could be increased through a complete reallocation of fluid milk 
advertising expenditures to cheese expenditures for funds pro­
vided by dairy farmers (Table 2). A reduction of 100% in fluid 
milk advertising expenditures by dairy farmers in expenditures on 
fluid milk (from about $2.3 million per month) and an increase of 
141% in cheese expenditures (from $1.7 million per month to 
$4.1 million per month) maximizes dairy farmer net revenues. 
The optimal allocation of advertising expenditures to the two 
products is not at all sensitive to the responsiveness of average 
animal lifetime. The optimal reallocation of expenditures results 
in a reduction in fluid milk sales and an increase in cheese sales, 
with behaviors similar to those observed for these products in 
response to a decrease and increase in advertising expenditures, 
respectively. Producer prices first increase, then decrease, then 
increase again in response the reallocation, more so in the final 
months of the simulation than as a part of the initial response. 
These results indicate that the current level of generic advertising 
expenditures could, if reallocated away from fluid milk and 
towards cheese, increase cumulative dairy farmer net revenues by 
27 to 31% compared to the baseline scenarios for the more and 
less responsive scenarios, respectively. Thus, without increasing 
expenditures by dairy farmers, reallocation of advertising to 
cheese would increase net revenues by more than 50% of the 
previously-reported increase generated by doubling advertising 
expenditures (Table 2). 
Why does this reallocation increase dairy farmer net revenues, 
when raw milk sold for beverage use has the highest minimum 
regulated price? Additional simulation analyses (not reported 
herein) to control for various factors suggest four principal 
reasons. First, fluid milk sold to consumers has a fat content less 
than that of raw milk. To achieve this lower fat content, fluid milk 
bottlers separate cream from the raw milk. This cream often ends 
up used to manufacture butter. An increase in fluid milk sales 
results in additional butter production and lower butter prices, 
which has an offsetting effect on all of the other minimum pricing 
formulae. Second, the assumed growth rate of demand for cheese 
is 1.5% per year, whereas no growth is assumed for fluid milk 
consumption. Increases in cheese sales due to generic advertising 
thus generate increased growth in demand for milk over time. 
The minimum price regulation formulae also have a key 
impact. The minimum regulated price for raw milk used as a 
beverage depends on the higher of (maximum) of the minimum 
regulated prices for milk used in cheese or whey or in butter and 
milk powder. In the 2004 base year, the minimum regulated price 
for milk used in cheese is higher, and thus also determined the 
minimum regulated price for fluid milk. An increase in generic 
advertising expenditures on cheese and a reduction in expendi­
tures on generic fluid milk advertising increases the cheese price 
(as in Fig. 6), which increases the minimum regulated price for 
both milk used in cheese and fluid milk. The relative price 
elasticities of demand for fluid milk and cheese also influence this 
outcome. An increase in generic advertising expenditures for 
cheese will increase the price of fluid milk, but fluid milk sales 
will decrease little because demand is highly inelastic. Con­
versely, an increase in generic advertising of fluid milk will 
increase cheese prices, but cheese sales will decrease to a greater 
extent (ceteris paribus) because cheese demand is more elastic. 
4. Conclusions and implications 
Although numerous econometric evaluations of generic 
dairy advertising exist, this study is the first to apply a stock-
flow-feedback systems model. This approach incorporates the 
complexities of milk characteristics and economic regulations 
of the US dairy industry. In particular, the model links milk 
supply response, dairy economic regulations, and pricing of all 
milk components to provide a more integrated and comprehen­
sive analysis of generic advertising impacts on the industry. 
The analysis reaffirms the findings of other authors that 
generic dairy advertising is a highly profitable activity on the part 
of dairy farmers and milk processors. Consideration of multiple 
balancing feedback loop effects results in estimated cumulative 
net benefit–cost ratios somewhat lower than previous estimates. 
Furthermore, unlike previous research, the results include provide 
detailed time paths of the response of important endogenous 
variables to changes in generic fluid milk and cheese advertising. 
One of the more relevant findings is the interaction between 
changes in demand caused by advertising, milk supply response 
and prices. Specifically, in the very short run, changes in adver­
tising are positively associated with changes in prices. However, 
over time, milk production responses significantly erode the price 
impacts of advertising, as indicated by patterns in both prices and 
net benefit cost ratios. Thus, the simplistic permanent step in 
expenditures approach adopted for the scenarios above could be 
refined to explore optimal inter-temporal allocation of advertising 
expenditures. 
The analysis of the optimal allocation of generic advertising 
between fluid milk and cheese indicates that dairy farmers could 
increase their net revenue by transferring all generic fluid milk 
advertising expenditures into generic cheese advertising assum­
ing fluid milk processors continue generic fluid advertising at 
2004 levels. The broader implication is that generic advertising 
efforts for dairy will be more effective if they increase demand 
for all dairy components proportional to the composition of raw 
milk. Nicholson and Stephenson (2006) find similar offsetting 
effects for promotional efforts focused on milk proteins. 
Many potential extensions of the model are possible, but three 
are the most relevant. One useful extension would be to use the 
current model to evaluate the optimality of other program ac­
tivities such as other promotion programs, public relations, spon­
sorship, and new product research. Funds from dairy farmers 
support a variety of promotional purposes, including product 
research and development and other forms of promotion in 
addition to advertising. Funds from fluid milk processors promote 
fluid milk only; dairy farmer funds promote dairy products and 
dairy ingredients. Because money is invested by dairy farmers in 
promotional activities other than generic advertising, an optimal 
portfolio analysis would be of tremendous interest to policy 
makers. 
As noted above, the optimal allocation of both advertising 
expenditures and other promotional activities over time could 
be analyzed, and has the potential to improve cumulative dairy 
farmer net revenues through reduction of the effects of the supply 
response feedback loop (which increases milk supplies). Finally, 
milk prices and supply response differ on a regional basis. Thus, a 
more significant extension would be to develop a multi-regional 
model that explicitly incorporates the regional pricing structure 
and supply response differences. Such an extension would also 
allow evaluating optimal advertising spending over geographic 
markets. 
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